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Abstract
Responding to the present and looming effects of global climate change presents a
challenging task for policymakers at all levels of governance. The outcomes of climate change
do present serious adaptation problems for global policy makers, but the implications of
climate change are more immediately experienced by local communities and policy makers.
Historical policymaking models suggest that economic well-being is an influential driver in local
policy adoption. This particular analysis explores the relationship between economic variables
and the development of climate adaptation policies by Connecticut municipalities. To test the
degree of interaction present, adaptation policy data in the form of relevant capital
improvement and zoning policies was collected from the individual municipalities. The towns
were then grouped by several economic variables to assess the impact of wealth on policy
generation. The analysis indicated that economic variables were not significant drivers of
climate adaptation at the local level of governance. Instead, the data suggests that town policy
is influenced by other policy drivers particularly the perceived and realized threat levels for
climate change within individual towns.
Introduction
There is a growing volume of literature that is linking higher concentrations of
atmospheric carbon to higher incidence of diseases (Epstein 2001; Epstein 2000; Epstein et. al
1998), increased storm frequency and intensity (Najjar et al., 2000; Meehl GA et. al 2000;
Fowler and Hennessey 1995), rises in sea levels (Cazenave et al. 2008; Rahmstorf 2006; Church
and White 2006), and a host of other serious problems for both natural and socioeconomic
systems (IPCC AR4 WG2, 2007). Even if you choose to question the link between anthropogenic
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carbon dioxide and global climate change, it is important to realize that with growing
populations, energy demands, and global gross domestic product, the range, frequency, and
severity of these effects is only going to increase (IPCC TAR SYR, 2001). Figure 1 below displays
a simplified interaction of these climate change impacts and policy responses.

Figure 1: Interaction of Policy Response and Impacts (IPCC TAR WG2, 2001)
As identified in Figure 1, the two major types of policy responses are mitigation and
adaptation. Mitigation responses work to reduce potential threats (e.g., GHGs), while
adaptation responses include actions that increase the ability to oppose, survive, and/or absorb
threats and return to an original state. Both responses are important to addressing the issue of
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climate change, but here I focus solely on adaptation through policy implementation by
institutions of governance.
Hiskes (2009) and Bryner (2011) both make strong cases that policymakers have a
responsibility to protect the environmental rights of current and future generations (e.g., the
rights to clean air, water and environmental quality). The effects of global climate change
threaten these environmental rights, making responding to climate change a challenging task
for policymakers at all levels of governance.
Even more challenging is the idea that many of the impacts of climate change, like rising
global temperatures, increasing extreme weather incidents, and changing weather patterns, are
born by people around the world regardless of whether they were contributing to climate
change. Climate mitigation and adaptation can therefore be framed as global public goods
because they are non-excludable and jointly produced (Samuelson, 1954). That is to say, the
benefits of adaptation and mitigation initiatives (reduced greenhouse gas emissions, flood
control, etc.), once in place, are experienced by everyone (even individuals or organizations
who didn’t contribute to the initiatives). The realization of these benefits by individuals also
doesn’t change the benefits available to other individuals. Additionally, working to improve or
preserve environmental quality in the context of specific climate change impacts (severe
weather frequency/intensity, higher temperatures, ocean acidification, incidence of disease,
etc.), has transboundary and global effects.
Even though climate change presents a serious problem for policy makers at all levels of
governance, the implications of climate change are more immediately experienced by
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communities and policy makers at the local level. As a result of this, municipalities in the United
States have become climate change policy leaders (Gore and Robinson 2009). Ostrom (2010)
argued that these efforts at a less-than-global scale can help reduce emissions to some extent,
and they can also spur their own governments to take necessary national and international
efforts.” United States’ local governments come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. In the
context of climate adaptation, some local governments and communities take immediate
initiative in responding to current or future threats (e.g., Figure 2), while other governments are
much more delayed in their responses to impacts.

Figure 2: Examples of Adaptation Responses (IPCC TAR WG2, 2001)
This study asks the following questions: what drives local and municipal policy makers
to develop climate adaptation policy in the midst of many competing policy demands? What
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determines whether a town will be proactive or reactionary in their dealings with climate
change?
To help answer questions like this, Feiock and West (1993) identify a set of explanatory
drivers of local policy adoption. Feiock and West’s discussion of policy drivers include:
• Need/Response Policymaking Model: focuses on governments responding to an
objective need for a policy.
• Diffusion of Innovation Model: focuses on the degree to which some governments
become policy leaders regarding the adoption of innovative approaches to policy
problems and the degree to which others then follow and diffuse such innovation.
• Political Institutions Model: focuses on electoral competition and governmental
structure as influential in understanding policy choice.
• Federalism Model: focuses attention on the degree to which localities adopt and
implement policy mandates from above (mostly state governments).
• Economic Model: argues that more affluent communities with greater fiscal resources
will be policy innovators.
• Interest Group Influence Model: competing demands from constituencies produce
demands for policy change.
• Administrative Capacity: focuses attention on the expertise and personnel resources
as drivers of innovation in adoption and implementation. A corollary to this explanation
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is Rabe’s (2004) findings about the impact of policy entrepreneurs within administrative
settings.
For the purposes of this analysis, we will primarily focus on Feiock and West’s economic
model to examine the degree to which economic forces drive action on climate adaptation. The
economic model suggests that more affluent communities with greater fiscal capacity will
engage in policy development and initiation to a greater extent than less affluent communities.
At the state level, fiscal capacity has been the best predictor of policy outputs (Dye 1966; 1979).
At the local level, fiscal constraints may be even more important. Paul Peterson (1981) argues
that many activities, particularly those with distributive or redistributive consequences, are not
in the "unitary" fiscal interest of cities. This economic explanation suggests that fiscal capacity
can create a barrier to the adoption of new policies for some communities (Feiock and West,
1993).
A number of studies have built upon the Economic Model suggested by Feiock and
West. One such study was Krause (2011) which found that local governments’ fiscal and human
capacities are the primary drivers of climate mitigation action in their jurisdictions. Boschken
(1998) came to a similar conclusion in finding that socioeconomic status is a significant factor
for understanding the siting of transit infrastructure. Specifically, more affluent communities
were more likely to develop mass transit.
In order to understand climate change adaptation at the local level, it is important to
recognize how social and political realities influence and shape one another. In addition to
drawing out the factors that enable municipalities to adopt climate change policy, the study
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also adds the dimension of constraints on adaptation. Following the logic of Adger et. al.
(2009), climate change adaptation is a social and political process, and as such limits is not
exclusively exogenously imposed. This means that external factors such as funding and
leadership (state, federal, international) on climate change (or lack thereof) are not the only
factors that determine adaptation policy. Rather, “adaptation to climate change is limited by
the values, perceptions, processes and power structures within society” (Adger et. al. 2009
pp.349). Thus, climate change adaptation is constrained by communities and the built,
economic, social, and natural environments in which they exist. For example, a municipality’s
climate adaptation efforts can be limited by constraints on funding and staffing that stem from
its economic environment (tax base, etc.), while also experiencing pressure from its social
environment in the form of skepticism on climate change.
The following discussion and analysis is part of a larger project 1 that examines how state
and local governments in the northeastern United States are engaging with climate change in
the relative vacuum of coherent and proactive global and federal policy. Although the
perception is that California has been the leader among US states in climate change policy over
the past decade, Connecticut and other Northeastern states were actually addressing climate
change policy first. The array of policies adopted by the State of Connecticut, other states in the
region, and various municipalities represents an aggressive approach to climate action when
compared to most other governmental units around the United States (Stoddard, 2010). The
policy developments in the Northeast are viewed as some of the leading edge programs
nationally (Selin and Van Deveer 2009).
1

The reader should note that this entire project is covered by UConn IRB protocol HR #10-108.
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Together, the various pieces of the Connecticut Climate Change Project (Boyer 2012;
2013; 2014) thus far describe the trajectory of climate change policy in a state known for
leading in this issue area, explore the coastal response to the threats and impacts of a changing
climate, and identify policy drivers for climate adaptation policy at the local level of
governance. In this particular paper I seek to build on these outcomes by expanding the
discussion of economic policy drivers to include the relationship between specific economic
variables and climate adaptation policy in Connecticut.
As identified, there are several facets to the larger project. One piece focuses on the
evolution of Connecticut climate policy and what implications it has for other regions of the
United States (see Boyer (2013). That portion of the project centers on interviews of policymakers involved in the development of Connecticut climate mitigation policy.
A second portion of the project builds on earlier work performed by Connecticut’s
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) to map climate change policy
development across the 169 municipalities in the state. The current project builds on that
effort through the gathering of policy data being shared between DEEP and the UConn research
team. In this particular paper, I address the question to what extent do economic factors drive
and/or influence how municipalities respond to the challenges of climate adaptation.
To answer this question, I will work to accomplish two main objectives:
1. Explore the extent to which wealth is impacting the creation of climate adaptation
policy at the local level of governance by examining adaptation policies across Connecticut
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municipalities with varying levels of economic prosperity as measured by selected economic
variables.
2. Identify and discuss alternative policymaking models and the towns’ barriers to local
climate adaptation.
Methodology
There has been three primary stages in the data collection process for the “169” project.
First, various demographic, social, geographic, and economic data were gathered for the 169
Connecticut towns from the American FactFinder (AFF) and American Community Survey (ACS)
Census Bureau databases. This data provide socio-economic statistics for the towns so that the
relative progress of climate adaptation policy generation could be compared across a range of
indicators.
The next part collected data on climate policy initiatives for the individual towns by
combining existing policy data with data gathered from an examination of town documents.
Such documents included Plans of Conservation and Development (POCD), zoning regulations,
capital improvement plans, fiscal budgets, stormwater management and erosion plans, statemandated Natural Hazard Mitigation Plans, and other documents related to sustainability
practices and capital improvement. The relevant climate adaptation policy data gathered from
these documents were split into two major classifications. The first classification was capital
improvement policies which focused on developing infrastructure and purchasing to respond to
future and current climate change impacts. The second classification was zoning policies which
focused on limiting and controlling the impacts of current and future development on
Bilich 10

adaptation capabilities. The data collected from town documents were then augmented by
phone calls to planning, zoning and land use officials in each town. In addition to developing a
better understanding of the town’s policy action, these interviews also helped assess the
perceived and realized barriers each town had for taking further action on climate adaptation.
These three data pieces provide a representative, if macro-level, body of information on
adaptation policies in Connecticut towns.
This particular analysis focuses on understanding the degree of interaction between
economic prosperity and the development of proactive climate adaptation policies and
identified barriers to adopting adaptation policies. In addition to the ACS and AFF data,
economic data for this analysis was also gathered from the Connecticut Department of Revenue
Services (DRS) and the CT Office of Policy and Management (OPM). The economic variables
considered for this analysis were mill rate, equalized net grand list, town percentage of total CT
earned income tax credits (EITC), income tax revenue per capita (by claims), and income per
capita (YPC). The definitions for these variables as well as their data source for this project are
displayed in Table 1 below.
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Table 1: Selected Economic Variables for CT Towns
Economic Variable Definition
Income per Capita
Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC)

Income tax per
capita
Mill Rate

Equalized Net
Grand List

Average income of all individuals within the town
(total income/population)
A refundable tax credit for low to moderate
income working individuals and couples—
particularly those with children. The amount of
EITC benefit depends on a recipient’s income and
number of children. (Number of EITCs for
individual town/Total EITCs for CT) (Data Source:
DRS, 2012)
Average income tax revenue per individual within
a town (Total CT Income Tax Revenue/Number of
returns from the town) (Data Source: DRS, 2012)
The amount of tax payable per dollar of the
assessed value of a property. Used to assess
property tax values for CT towns (Data Source:
AFF, 2012)
The full-value estimate of all taxable property
within the CT Townships (Data Source: OPM, 2012)

Data
Source
ACS
2012
DRS
2012

DRS
2012
AFF
2012

OPM
2012

All of the variables in Table 1 can be representative of a town’s overall economic wellbeing which makes them ideal for testing to what extent affluence and economic status
influences climate adaptation policy at the local level of governance. To test this idea, town
financial barriers, capital improvement policies, and zoning policies were viewed in the context
of these economic variables. Specifically, towns were grouped into different tiers based on the
recorded values for the economic variables. Once grouped, policy counts were conducted and
median and average policy generation values for both capital and zoning policies were recorded
for the different classes or tiers of economic prosperity. This process helped to “control” for
wealth as a policy driver. The towns are also grouped by geographic location (coastal, river, and
Bilich 12

inland towns) to aid in the development of alternative models. This examination of economic
drivers for climate policy will help test the influence of those factors relative to other causes of
policy action as discussed earlier/further on.
Data and Analysis
The following analysis begins by exploring the validity of Feiock and West’s (1993)
Economic Policymaking Model in the context of local climate adaptation policies in Connecticut,
specifically whether or not wealthy towns are actually acting as policy innovators for climate
adaptation. From there, the analysis looks at other policy drivers and offers a look at how
comparatively significant the economic policy drivers are.
The first part of the analysis examines town capital improvement and zoning policies
controlling for selected economic variables. The economic variables considered are town
income per capita (YPC), percentage of total CT earned income tax credits (EITC), income tax
revenue per capita (by claims), mill rate, and equalized net grand list. Tables 2-6 display the
results of the categorized policy counts.
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Table 2: CT Town Capital Improvement and Zoning Adaptation Policy
(Controlled for Income per Capita)
Town
Type

Income Per
Capita ($)

Total
Towns

Median
Capital

Avg. # of Capital
Policies per
Town

Median
Zoning

Coastal

<30000
30000<x<50000
>50000

5
14
5

6.00
5.00
5.00

5.40
5.54
6.20

8.00
9.50
7.00

Avg. # of
Zoning
Policies per
Town
8.60
9.93
8.00

Riverine

<30000
30000<x<50000
>50000

8
30
4

3.50
2.00
2.00

4.13
2.77
2.25

6.00
8.00
4.50

6.50
7.83
4.75

Inland

<30000
30000<x<50000

26
582

3.00
3.00

3.31
2.83

7.50
7.00

8.00
7.60

>50000

15

3.00

2.20

8.00

8.47

<30000
30000<x<50000

39
1023

3.00
3.00

3.74
3.11

8.00
7.00

7.77
7.95

>50000

24

3.00

3.25

7.00

7.90

Total

In Table 2, zoning and capital adaptation policies by town are controlled for income per
capita. As can be seen there is little to no pattern in policy creation for towns with varying
income per capita levels. Both Boschken (1998) and Feiock and West (1993) identified the idea
that more affluent communities would be stronger policy developers and innovators. Income
per capita is one of the clearest ways of showing affluence, and the data suggests that affluence
is playing little to no role in climate adaptation policy at the local level.

2
3

57 for Zoning
101 for Zoning
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Table 3: CT Town Capital Improvement and Zoning Adaptation Policy
(Controlled for Percentage of Total CT EITCs)
Town
Type

Percent of
total EITCs

Total
Towns

Median
Capital

Avg. # of Capital
Policies per
Town

Median
Zoning

Coastal

<.5%
.5%<x<1%
>1%

13
4
7

5.00
6.50
5.50

5.15
6.50
6.17

10.00
7.50
9.00

Avg. # of
Zoning
Policies per
Town
9.92
8.50
8.43

Riverine

<.5%
.5%<x<1%
>1%

35
3
4

2.00
3.00
2.50

2.91
2.67
3.75

7.00
4.00
10.50

7.03
6.00
10.50

Inland

<.5%
.5%<x<1%
>1%

81
74
11

3.00
2.00
2.00

2.99
2.57
2.09

8.00
6.00
5.50

8.09
7.29
6.20

Total

<.5%
.5%<x<1%

129
145

3.00
3.50

2.91
4.14

7.00
9.00

7.88
8.62

>1%

22

5.00

5.00

7.00

7.64

Connecticut town capital Improvement and zoning adaptation policies controlled for
percentage of EITCs are shown in Table 3. EITCs, or earned income tax credits, are refundable
tax credits for low to moderate income individuals. They are calculated and distributed based
on income level and number of dependents particularly children. If Connecticut towns were all
equal in population and wealth, each town would get 1/169 or approximately .5% of the EITCs.
However, this is not the case and lower income towns will generally have a higher percentage
of the total EITCs distributed by the state. The table controls for towns taking varying
percentages of EITCs. If Feiock and Wests (1993) suggested Economic Model was influencing
4
5

6 for Zoning
13 for Zoning
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climate adaptation policy, we would expect to see the towns taking a larger percentage of EITCs
having less policy generation. The data in Table 3 suggests that this isn’t the case, and in fact
the opposite appears to be true for capital improvement adaptation policies.
Table 4: CT Town Capital Improvement and Zoning Adaptation Policy
(Controlled for Income Tax per Capita)
Town Type

Income Tax per
Capita ($)6

Total Towns

Median
Capital

Avg. # of Capital
Policies per
Town

Median
Zoning

Avg. # of
Zoning
Policies per
Town

Coastal

<2000
2000<x<6000
>6000

5
12
7

7.00
5.00
5.00

7.60
5.00
5.29

9.00
9.50
10.00

8.80
9.00
10.00

Riverine

<2000
2000<x<6000
>6000

8
30
4

2.50
2.00
3.00

2.88
3.07
2.50

8.00
7.00
5.50

7.38
7.47
5.75

Inland

<2000
2000<x<6000
>6000

19
677
13

2.00
3.00
3.00

2.68
2.73
3.77

6.50
7.00
7.00

7.50
7.96
7.69

Total

<2000
2000<x<6000
>6000

32
1098
24

3.00
3.00
3.00

3.77
3.08
3.54

7.00
8.00
7.00

7.48
8.10
7.54

Table 4 shows the same policy data, but controlled for income tax per capita. No real
trend appears from the data when it is controlled for income tax per capita. From Feiock and
West’s (1993) model, it would be expected that towns with higher income tax revenue per
capita (wealthier towns), might have greater policy innovation.
6

Calculated by returns
66 for Zoning
8
108 for Zoning
7
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Table 5: CT Town Capital Improvement and Zoning Adaptation Policy
(Controlled for Mill Rate)
Town
Type

Mill Rate

Total
Towns

Median
Capital

Avg. # of
Capital
Policies per
Town

Median
Zoning

Avg. # of
Zoning
Policies per
Town

Coastal

<20
20<x<30
>30

10
7
7

5.00
4.50
7.00

5.80
5.00
6.00

10.00
9.00
8.00

10.30
8.43
8.57

Riverine

<20
20<x<30
>30

12
27
3

2.00
3.00
4.00

2.17
3.11
5.00

6.50
7.00
8.00

7.33
7.19
8.00

Inland

<20
20<x<30
>30

10
749
15

3.00
2.50
3.00

2.70
2.86
2.93

9.50
7.00
6.00

9.80
7.84
6.53

Total

<20
20<x<30

32
10810

3.00
3.00

3.47
3.05

9.00
7.00

9.03
7.71

>30

25

4.00

4.04

7.00

7.42

Table 5 shows the policy generation data controlled for mill rate. As can be seen there
is little to no pattern in policy creation for towns with varying mill rates. Zoning adaptation
policy creation tends to decrease with increasing mill rates while capital improvement policy
tends to increase. While mill rate doesn’t specifically measure the wealth of a town, affluent
towns tend to have lower mill rates because they make a lot of money off of low property taxes
on properties with high values. Poverty-stricken towns have trouble raising appraisal rates in
less-than-attractive neighborhoods, and that's when mill rates start to increase. This in mind, if

9

73 for Zoning Policies
107 for Zoning Policies

10
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Feiock and West’s (1993) suggested Economic Model was significantly affecting climate
adaptation policy at the local level of governance; we could reasonably expect that as mill rate
increased, policy generation would decrease.
Table 6: CT Town Capital Improvement and Zoning Adaptation Policy (Controlled for Net
Equalized Grand List)
Town
Type

Net Equalized
Grand List ($)

Total
Towns

Median
Capital

Avg. # of Capital
Policies per
Town

Median
Zoning

Avg. # of
Zoning Policies
per Town

Coastal

<1 billion
1 billion<x<5 billion

0
12

N/A
5.00

N/A
5.25

N/A
10.00

N/A
10.00

>5 billion

12

6.00

6.09

9.00

8.50

<1 billion
1 billion<x<5 billion

8
30

2.00
3.00

2.64
3.19

6.00
7.50

6.36
7.42

>5 billion

4

2.00

2.60

8.00

8.60

Inland

<1 billion
1 billion<x<5 billion
>5 billion

37
50
1211

2.00
3.00
3.00

2.14
3.22
3.58

8.00
7.00
7.00

8.03
7.88
7.00

Total

<1 billion
1 billion<x<5 billion

45
92

2.00
3.00

2.25
3.49

7.00
8.00

7.65
8.03

>5 billion

2812

4.00

4.39

7.00

7.93

Riverine

Table 6 displays the policy generation controlled by the town’s net equalized grand list
values. Of the five economic variables, net equalized grand list had the clearest trend. As can
be seen, as the grand list values increased, towns tended to have greater policy generation,

11
12

11 for Zoning
27 for Zoning
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particularly capital improvement policy. It is a small trend, but none the less, it is the trend that
would be expected if Feiock and West’s (1993) economic model was driving the creation of
town level climate adaptation policy.
In addition to the count tables, correlation tests were also run between the economic
variables and policy variables to better characterize the count table results. The policy variables
for these tests were number of capital improvement policies (NCapital), number of zoning
policies (NZoning), and interview response indicating that funding was a barrier (BarrFund). The
results are shown in tables 7 and 8.
Table 7: Policy Correlations and P-values- Mill Rate, YPC, Income Tax per Capita
Mill Rate
Pearson
Coefficient
NCAPITAL
0.091
NZONING
-0.150
BARRFUND
-0.028

YPC

P-Value
0.242
0.052
0.722

Pearson
Coefficient
-0.041
0.071
-0.109

Income Tax per Capita
P-Value
0.595
0.362
0.157

Pearson
Coefficient
0.102
0.015
-0.104

P-Value
0.188
0.848
0.178

Table 8: Policy Correlations and P-values- %EITC and Grand list (Highlights indicate weak
correlations and significance at .001 level)
%EITC
Pearson
Coefficient
NCAPITAL
0.296
NZONING
-0.046
BARRFUND
0.040

Grand List

P-Value
0.000
0.555
0.609

Pearson
Coefficient
0.415
0.022
-0.131

P-Value
0.000
0.777
0.088
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Table 7 shows the correlation results for all of the economic variables except net
equalized grand list and %EITC. The correlation tests for the other three variables indicate no
relationship between the economic variables and the number of capital improvement or zoning
adaptation policies. These results support the “no trend” observations from the previous
tables. In table 8, both the correlation coefficient between net equalized grand list and the
number of capital improvement policies and the correlation coefficient between EITC and
capital improvement policies indicate a weak statistical correlation (highlighted). These
outcomes were significant at the .001 level. This supports the trend that towns with higher
grand list values tended to have greater capital improvement policy generation which was
observed in table 6. It also suggests that towns with more valuable properties (higher net
equalized grand list), are investing more effort/resources (as evidenced by greater policy
generation) into protecting the properties through adaptation.
Another important thing to note from the correlation coefficients is that none of the
economic variables had a significant statistical correlation with interview responses indicating
that funding was a barrier (BarrFund). This is a particularly interesting finding because 71%
percent of the towns that had interviews conducted (89% 13), responded that for their town,
funding was a significant barrier to taking further action on climate change (Table 9).

13

151 out of 169 towns had interview data (89%)
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Table 9: Barriers to Climate Policy Action by Town Type
Type of Barrier

Coastal
(n=2414)
66%
42%

Riverine
(n=4415)
75%
50%

Inland
(n=89)
71%
43%

All types
(n=151)
71%
44%

Lack of public information

33%

45%

33%

35%

Other issues take priority

13%

39%

38%

34%

Lack of funding
Insufficient state/federal coord.

Climate change skepticism
Insufficient private/public coord.
Insufficient staff
Other barriers

8%

18%

34%

26%

13%
13%
8%

18%
16%
2%

12%
21%
2%

14%
19%
3%

While it is probably true that funding will be an issue regardless of the town or policy
action, it is interesting to see an apparent disconnect between economic status (tested
variables) and “funding” as an issue. It certainly raises the question of to what extent funding is
actually a barrier versus just a stated barrier.
Even with the weak correlation of grand list, EITC and capital adaptation policy, it is
evident that the economic drivers of policy as identified by both Boschken (1998) and Feiock

14

Coastal towns included towns designated as both coastal and riverine. Overlapping towns:
Groton, Milford, New London, Old Saybrook, Stratford, Waterford.
15

Riverine towns included towns designated as both coastal and riverine
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and West (1993) are having little, if any, influence on climate adaptation policy at the local level
of governance. This, of course, begs the question…what is?
As part of the larger project (see Boyer, 2014), the capital and zoning policy data was
similarly controlled for town population, population density, and education levels. It was
thought that these variables might be influencing policy generation 16, but when there was little
variation across the control variables. This indicated that the suggested factors were not
influential as policy drivers for local climate adaptation.
In addition to these controls, the larger research project (Boyer (2014)) also explored
other policy driver models from Feiock and West (1993) in the context of climate adaptation
policy. The results of this analysis are talked about in the discussion below.

16

Larger population towns might have more resources to take policy action; population density
could drive a need for adaptation because of more concentrated loss/damage; towns with
higher educational attainment might have less climate change skepticism
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Towns with State-Mandated
Natural Hazard Mitigation Plans

Towns with State-Recommended
Climate Change Vulnerability
Assessments

Towns with StateRecommended Climate
Change Action Plans

Figure 3 – Climate Planning in Connecticut
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Table 10: Climate Change Plans by Town Type
Plan type
Town type
Coastal17
Riverine18
Inland19
All types

Climate change
action plan
46%
(N=24)
13%
(N=39)
5%
(N=91)
14%20
(N=154)

Climate change
vulnerability assessment
58%
(N=24)
10%
(N=39)
5%
(N=91)
15%21
(N=154)

Natural Hazard
Mitigation Plan
92%
(N=24)
63%
(N=43)
81%
(N=102)
79%22
(N=169)

Figure 3 and Table 10 provide strong evidence for the existence of the Need/Response
Policymaking Model (Feiock and West (1993)) within climate adaptation policy. The data shows
that nearly half of Connecticut coastal towns are engaged in significant adaptation planning
with a climate change action plan, compared to just 13% of riverine towns and only 5% of
inland towns. Compared to inland and riverine towns, coastal towns are impacted more by
climate change, particularly rising sea levels and severe weather damage like storm surge and
flooding. The need and desire to respond to these threats has become even more prominent as
Hurricane Sandy, Hurricane Irene, and several other major coastal storms have had harsh
impacts on coastal communities. Coastal town governments need to consider the management
of dense coastal development, flood threats, and emergency response to natural disasters
17

Coastal includes towns that are both coastal & riverine. Overlapping towns: Groton, Milford, New London, Old
Saybrook, Stratford, Waterford. There are 24 coastal towns, a 100% response rate.
18
Riverine excludes towns that are both riverine and coastal. There are 43 inland towns, a 90% response rate for
action plans and vulnerability assessments, and a 100% response rate for riverine town NHMP data.
19
There are 102 inland towns, an 89% response rate for action plans and vulnerability assessments, and a 100%
response rate for inland town NHMP data.
20
N=154 for climate change action plans, 91% response rate
21
N=154 for climate change vulnerability assessments, 91% response rate
22
N=169 for NHMPs, 100% response rate
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more as they plan for the future. Table 10 also points out that coastal towns are far more likely
than riverine or inland towns to have completed a climate change vulnerability assessment,
indicating that the impacts of climate change necessitated a policy response.
Table 11: Capital & Zoning Adaptation Policies by Town Type
Types of Adaptation Policies
Town type

Median no.
of capital
policies
5

Coastal23
(N=24)

Riverine24
(N=42)

2

Inland25
(N=99 for
capital, N=98
for zoning)

3

Most common capital
policies


Drainage infrastructure
 Open space
 Stormwater
management
 Drainage infrastructure
 Open space
 Bridges
 Drainage infrastructure
 Open space
 Bridges or roads

Median no.
of zoning
policies
9

7

7

Most common zoning
policies


Restrict coastal
development
 Water quality
 Wetlands
 Open space
 Floodplains
 Erosion
 Water quality
 Open space
 Wetlands

Table 11 further supports Feiock & West’s (1993) Need/Response policymaking model,
as coastal towns have a noticeably higher median number of capital improvement and zoning
policies related to climate change adaptation. .
As the reader will note, there are more climate-relevant zoning policies overall than
capital projects, but both support a proactive adaptation agenda. Improving drainage
23

Coastal includes towns that are both coastal & riverine. Overlapping towns: Groton, Milford, New London, Old
Saybrook, Stratford, Waterford. There are 24 coastal towns, a 100% response rate.
24
Riverine excludes towns that are both riverine and coastal.
25
Inland towns are neither coastal nor riverine.
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infrastructure was the most common capital policy across all three categories of towns, which
included cleaning, maintaining, and replacing pipes, drains, and culverts. Purchasing or
conserving open space was the second most frequent capital project after drainage, but was
described in town Plans of Conservation and Development (POCDs) as reducing strain on
drainage infrastructure by collecting and absorbing stormwater.
Top municipal priorities for zoning were much more heterogeneous. Coastal towns
emphasized restricting or reducing the density of coastal development in an effort to lessen
property damage from coastal storms and pressure on drainage systems from increasing
impervious surfaces. They also focused on protecting coastal wetlands and open space and
minimizing the extension of sewer systems to reduce the risk of contaminating water supplies.
Riverine and inland towns were also concerned about water quality, flooding, and protecting
wetlands and animal habitats, but did not face the additional challenge of high population
density in particularly vulnerable areas that was seen in almost all coastal communities.
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Table 12: Barriers to Climate Policy Action by Town Type
Town type
Type of Barrier
Lack of funding
Insufficient state/federal
coord.
Lack of public information
Other issues take priority
Climate change skepticism
Insufficient private/public
coord.
Insufficient staff
Other barriers

Coastal
(n=2426)
66%
42%

Riverine
(n=4427)
75%
50%

Inland
(n=89)
71%
43%

All types
(n=151[3])
71%
44%

33%
13%
8%
13%

45%
39%
18%
18%

33%
38%
34%
12%

35%
34%
26%
14%

13%
8%

16%
2%

21%
2%

19%
3%

The interview responses in Table 12 (Table 9 reprinted) also support the Feiock and
West (1993) Need/Response model. The highlighted data displays the percent of each town
type responding that the barriers to taking further action on climate adaptation were other
issues taking priority and climate change skepticism. It is interesting to note that coastal towns
had a significantly lower response rate for these barriers which suggests that climate change is
a more serious/prevalent issue for coastal towns than it is for riverine and inland towns.

26

Coastal includes towns that are both coastal & riverine. Overlapping towns: Groton, Milford, New London, Old
Saybrook, Stratford, Waterford.
27

Riverine includes towns that are both coastal & riverine
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Table 13: Anecdotal Comments from Town Calls
Town
type
Coastal

Riverine

Inland

Interview comments


Constituent Buy-In - Particularly in poor communities tying our actions to efforts
that are understandable to people is very important; meaning that in order to get
buy-in there needs to be a recognition that it affects someone personally in the
short term. In the short term this is most understandable from the flooding,
natural disaster side and tying our efforts into mitigation strategies.
 It's an election year, and climate change has become a political issue.
 Towns are already developed, and it’s not like we can make up regulations that
require people to elevate their homes or move further back from the coast,
because they’re already there.
 The greatest barrier to addressing climate change lies in convincing policy makers
of the problem.
 There's a historic tradition of building/living on the coast, and we have to educate
people as to where they should live. This isn't Holland, and we can't engineer our
way out of the sea level rise- people can't just build walls around their coastal
houses, because the walls will cave in.
 Money is the big issue in addressing climate change. We have the time but we do
not have the financial resources.
 The John Birch Society and its anti-UN Agenda 21, anti-ICLEI rhetoric has come to
town and if it gains traction, it could make our upcoming Plan of Conservation
and Development adoption in 2015 problematic if we include too much
discussion on sustainability issues, as it has around the country.
 Budgeting constraints. Other projects take precedence over climate change.
 Because of the size of the community and limited resources members do not
know their exact role in addressing climate change
 We haven’t encountered any barriers because none of this has gone anywhere
yet.
 There are still influential individuals who hold that the concept of anthropogenic
climate change is based on manipulated data and has no basis in fact. To date
there seems to be insufficient political will on the part of town leadership to
pursue the task of developing a comprehensive policy at the municipal level.
 Guidelines on climate change from the DEEP and State would help, as would
grants to help us prepare a climate change report.
 “Specific information on the identifiable impact that climate change will have on
the town… would be helpful”
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“I do not think [our town] will be affected by climate change because it is not
close to the shores.”
It’s not that we don’t take climate change seriously; it’s that small towns are
faced with sinking budgets, and have a number of statutory mandates they have
to satisfy. Small towns are less likely to have the money to pay for a climate
change study, especially when there is an ongoing debate over climate change.
For instance, the Public Works Director does not believe in climate change.
Our Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan addresses flooding issues and vulnerabilities
to natural disasters.
“The effects of that hurricane [Sandy] were visible in [our town], even though we
aren’t prone to flooding as they are on the coast. …Large swaths of pine stands in
the centennial forest were devastated by the hurricane, and whether or not the
intensity of those hurricanes was caused or can be shown to be caused by climate
change, it is certainly very visible and a cause for complaint…”
“We’re seeing some acknowledgement of the impacts of climate change in
regional plans of climate change. For example, [one regional Council of
Governments] included a chapter on climate change in their regional plan. We
never would have seen that 10 years ago.”
No one steps forward to say, “This stuff is important and here is what I want my
town to do about it now!”
Educating our local land use board members and the public would help.

Table 13 provides some qualitative data anecdotes from telephone and e-mail
interviews with town planning and conservation staff members, as well as regional planning
organizations. This data gives a glimpse into how municipal and regional planners within the
different town categories perceived climate change, whether they prioritized adaptation and
the obstacles they faced. The anecdotal quotes in table 13 were selected to showcase town
priorities and obstacles rather than represent the most frequent types of comments.
The comments further illustrate the differences between the coastal, riverine, and
inland towns. Coastal towns tended to prioritize the framing of climate change within policy
and community discussions. Many towns talked about the need for constituent and
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policymaker buy-in. In addressing this, towns are faced with an interesting dynamic of
balancing the immediacy of the climate change problem without politicizing the issue to a point
of inaction. Coastal towns also focused on the problem of existing infrastructure. To a far
greater extent than riverine and inland towns, coastal towns have to adapt around existing
infrastructure and more significantly, entrenched behavioral norms. For example, a coastal
municipality might need to erect flood and drainage infrastructure like sea walls or elevated
buildings to effectively respond to the current and future impacts of climate change, but it
might prove to be difficult to move existing buildings to higher ground or build sea walls outside
of people’s longtime beach homes.
Riverine and inland towns both appeared to prioritize other issues over climate change.
With regards to climate change, a large priority for both town types was the need for more
resources, both financial and educational, to catalyze action and address skepticism. The
anecdotal comments for riverine and inland towns also highlights the wide variety of responses
and focuses which indicates that climate change is not too pressing of an issue for the towns at
the moment.
Summary of Findings and Policy Implications
Somewhat unexpectedly, Feiock and West’s (1993) Economic Policymaking Model and
Boschken’s (1998) conclusion that wealthier towns were more likely to be on the forefront of
policy development don’t appear to be influencing climate adaptation policy at the local level of
governance. Economic variables certainly might play a role in the type of projects or response a
town is capable, or at least more likely, to implement, but they don’t seem to be driving policy
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generation for Connecticut townships. The significance findings for the interaction of EITC and
grand list with capital improvement policies suggest that the two causal variables should be
examined within a multivariate statistical model to better characterize the interaction of policy
drivers. Economic variables tend to be at the forefront of discussion for town officials, and will
therefore act as both perceived and realized barriers for policy generation. The finding
discussed here is important for local and state policymakers to consider in addressing these
barriers and their validity in future planning efforts.
This conclusion is also valuable because it highlights the importance of other policy
drivers for both local and state policymakers. The Connecticut Climate Change Project (Boyer
2012; 2013, 2014) identifies some of the other drivers in play including policy entrepreneurship,
federalism, and political culture. Probably the most influential driver identified by the larger
project and discussed in this analysis is the Need/Response Model. Greater generation of
capital and zoning climate adaptation policies and attention to climate change in general was
observed in coastal towns than in inland and riverine towns largely due to the fact that coastal
towns were experiencing, and therefore responding, to a wider variety of threats and indeed
greater effect from these threats of climate change. The Need/Response Model was supported
by the capital and zoning adaptation policy generation as coastal towns across the board had
greater adaptation policy generation than did riverine and inland towns. The higher barrier
response rates for climate change skepticism and other issues taking priority by inland and
riverine also indicated the influence of the Need/Response Model. Finally, the anecdotal
interview comments (Table 13) also highlighted the Need/Response Model because coastal
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towns’ responses indicated more concerned with the issue of climate change and the need for
a corresponding effective response than did inland and riverine towns’.
An important next step in the overall project should be the development of a
multivariate statistical model to view the interaction between potential policy drivers including
the economic drivers and the need/response model discussed in this analysis.
Going forward the analyses presented in this paper as well as the larger climate change
project can help Connecticut policymakers to recognize the barriers and drivers for potential
adaptation policy within their municipalities. At the town level, this data can help influence the
decision making of local officials with regards to climate change. Towns can look to other towns
with similar characteristics for frameworks for effective adaptation policies. The database will
also promote regional communication between towns on the issue of climate adaptation.
At the state level, it is important for policymakers to consider the different drivers and
barriers for the different town classes as state climate adaptation policy and response is
developed. The Need/Response Policymaking Model addressed above, shows the importance
of coastal proximity and threat. Coastal towns experience climate change impacts, particularly
rising sea levels and a higher incidence of severe weather, to a much larger degree than do
inland and riverine towns. As a result of this, of the three town types (coastal, inland, riverine),
coastal towns tend to have greater acceptance of the issue of climate change, which, in turn,
causes greater policy generation on average. The different town types also prioritize
adaptation initiatives differently (see Table 11). It is therefore necessary for state and local
authorities to change policy objectives depending on the individual towns. For example state
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officials may need to provide direct project support for coastal towns (funding/staffing for
specific coastal development control projects), while overcoming skepticism in inland and
riverine towns through both direct outreach and engagement of NGO’s and other potential
policy entrepreneurs.
State adaptation efforts should also try to address the towns’ perceived barriers to
climate change (Table 12, 13). Funding was by far the largest reported barrier for towns. At
some rate, funding will always be a policy inhibitor, but at the state level there could be a
different allocation or prioritization of funding, staffing, and time to help alleviate the burden of
the perceived barrier. More importantly, 44% of the towns responded that insufficient state
and federal coordination was a barrier to taking further action on climate change. United States
federal constitutional law and state law assert that local governments derive their existence,
their territorial scope, their functions, and their powers from their states (Hunter v. Pittsburgh
1907). Over time courts and states have expanded the role of local institutions of governance,
but municipalities still tend to look to higher levels of governance, particularly state
governments, for leadership and direction on how to respond to issues. In addition, most of the
funding for local governments comes from funding allocation by higher levels of government
(Briffault, 2010). Presently the lack of centralized climate adaptation policy and response by
the state is limiting the effectiveness of adaptation at the local level. Finally, it is the author’s
opinion that state authorities can work to address the barriers of other issues taking priority
and skepticism by generating constituent buy-in through educational outreach (e.g. why should
individuals care?). This should include both effects of climate change and climate change
solutions for individual community members.
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One thing is very clear…it will take a concentrated, coordinated and informed effort by
both state and local policymakers to effectively address and respond to the issue of climate
change.
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